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Paul Michael Wihbey and Ilan Berman
The current freeze in negotiations between Israel and Syria underscoresthe fact that water is rapidly becoming a crucial — if not the most
significant — strategic issue between nations in the Middle East. According
to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, speaking on Israeli television, water
was one of the three key issues that stood in the way of an agreement in
Geneva.
From the start, water has been a central theme in the Israeli-Syrian
dialogue. Suffering from over-irrigation, excessive pollution, and a growing
population, Syria has viewed negotiations with Israel as a means by which
to alleviate its chronic water problem. Hence, Syrian President Hafiz al-
Assad’s insistence on an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, border.
Aside from the political victory that such an action would signal, the de-
mand is also an effort to gain control over water sources on the Golan
Heights. An Israeli withdrawal would give Syria access to the eastern half
of the Jordan River headwaters and bring it to the shores of Lake Kinneret.
This would make Mr. Assad a partner to Israeli water, giving Syria legal
rights to use Lake Kinneret as it deems fit, including piping fresh water
back to Damascus.
By contrast, the United States and Israel have sought a regional ap-
proach. The original idea seems to have been to stave-off Syrian demands
for sharing the Kinneret by integrating Turkey into the talks to provide
additional water. To this end, State Department spokesman James Rubin
emphasized on January 12 [2000] that “water, given its nature, is an issue
that is not only between Israel and Syria but has a regional dimension as
well, including Turkey, and any solutions must take on that same regional
dimension.” Turkey, however, has clearly signaled its lack of enthusiasm. A
recent report in the Turkish Daily News (February 10) stated that, accord-
ing to a senior Turkish diplomat, the United States and Israel understood
Turkey’s message that Turkish water could not be bargained over in the
equation of the Middle East peace process.
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This reluctance stems from a mature Turkish reading of Syrian intentions.
Since the 1980s, relations between the two countries have been strained at
best, in part due to Turkey’s construction of the ambitious Southeast
Anatolia (GAP) Project on the headwaters of the Euphrates. Despite efforts
to allay Syrian fears, such as a protocol between the two countries in 1987
that codified Turkey’s water commitments to Syria, Damascus has bridled at
the loss of control over Euphrates water, and has consistently attempted to
regain the strategic initiative. In Mr. Assad’s mind, integrating Turkey into
the negotiations might just do the trick. A Turkish commitment to water-
sharing as part of an Israeli-Syrian peace deal would shift the momentum in
Syria’s favor, making Ankara accountable to Damascus for its water use
and allocations. With this in mind, Turkey has understandably chosen to
keep a safe distance from the Syrian-Israeli talks.
Recognizing Turkey’s hesitation, Syria has opted instead for a full-court
press on the water issue in negotiations with Israel and the United States.
The incentive for Mr. Assad, of course, is the enticing prospect of rolling
back Israeli sovereignty without any significant political, diplomatic, mili-
tary, or economic cost. But Syria’s gambit to retrieve the Golan is not just an
effort to score a diplomatic coup and provide a solution to its domestic
water needs. It is also a concrete move by which to seize control of this
strategic resource away from Israel. In the Syrian view, water is not only a
commodity, but also a strategic resource and an essential tool by which to
alter the balance of power equation in its favor. Mr. Assad understands that
water can be the instrument by which to gain an economic and strategic
advantage over Israel.
Thus, by targeting Israel’s most vulnerable strategic asset, its dwindling
water supplies, Syria has been able to position itself to profoundly influence
Israel’s bargaining posture over borders and security. This, more than any
other factor, may be the reason why Israel has not committed itself to a
written agreement regarding a redeployment to the June 4, 1967, line. To do
so would be to signal an irrevocable surrender of both the Jordan River and
the Kinneret. But renewed rhetoric in Israel seems to suggest that policy-
makers are seriously considering just such a move. This would be a win-win
situation for Syria. At best, Mr. Assad would not only score a major victory
by gaining back the Golan, but also dramatically alter the water equation,
and by extension the balance of power, between Israel and Syria. At the
very least, the water issue could drive a wedge between Israel and Turkey.
As policy planners struggle to revive the Syrian-Israeli dialogue once
again, resolving the topic of water remains the most difficult task for the
two countries. It is also the most important. The way the water issue plays
out will have major repercussions not only for Israel, but the region as a
whole. The ensconcement of Syria on the Golan would allow Damascus not
only to virtually dictate terms to Jerusalem, but exert influence over Amman
and create a rift in the Israeli-Turkish military partnership as well. Given
the signals made by Israel’s continued efforts to reopen talks with Syria,
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Jerusalem has not yet understood the geopolitical significance of water to its
relations with its neighbors. As a result, Mr. Assad has been given an
incentive to continue to apply the appropriate pressure, diplomatic as well
as military, to achieve his goals.
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